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Abstract
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are one of the
well-known models to generate synthetic data including
images, especially for research communities that cannot
use original sensitive datasets because they are not pub-
licly accessible. One of the main challenges in this area
is to preserve the privacy of individuals who participate
in the training of the GAN models. To address this chal-
lenge, we introduce a Differentially Private Conditional
GAN (DP-CGAN) training framework based on a new
clipping and perturbation strategy, which improves the
performance of the model while preserving privacy of the
training dataset. DP-CGAN generates both synthetic data
and corresponding labels and leverages the recently intro-
duced Re´nyi differential privacy accountant to track the
spent privacy budget. The experimental results show that
DP-CGAN can generate visually and empirically promis-
ing results on the MNIST dataset with a single-digit ep-
silon parameter in differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Recent studies have shown that deep neural networks
(DNNs) can achieve state-of-the-art performance in var-
ious applications such as image recognition [1, 2], natu-
ral language processing [3], speech recognition [4, 5] and
complex video games [6, 7]. It has not only achieved ex-
ceptional accuracy in different tasks but also surpassed
human-level performance in some of them [6, 8]. DNNs
have also been leveraged in health-related studies rang-
ing from medical images [9–13] to human genome analy-
ses [14–16].
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [17] form a
well-researched class of generative models [18–21]. They
can learn the distribution of the training data and generate
synthetic data with a distribution very similar to the distri-
bution of the training data. GAN models are particularly
used by research communities to generate the synthetic
datasets in cases where they cannot directly access sensi-
tive datasets. However, using sensitive data to train GAN
models raises privacy concerns for participating individu-
als. Indeed, recent works show that most machine learn-
ing models, including GAN models, are vulnerable to a
slew of attacks (from model inversion attacks to member-
ship inference attacks) that can expose significant infor-
mation about training data [22–25].
Differential Privacy (DP) [26, 27] is a common tech-
nique to protect the privacy of ML models trained on sen-
sitive data. However, in spite of its popularity, there have
been very few recent studies on training GANs in a dif-
ferentially private way [28–32]. The standard procedure
leveraged by these recent studies to enforce DP is to first
clip the l2 norm of the gradients of the sum of the discrim-
inator’s loss on real and fake data and then add Gaussian
noise to the clipped gradients. To keep track of the pri-
vacy budget, they typically use the Moment Accountant
(MA) technique [33]. One of the limitations of these re-
cent works is that they focus exclusively on generating
synthetic data (e.g., images) without corresponding labels
– an aspect that renders the synthetically generated data
useless for supervised learning applications. More im-
portantly, training high quality GANs with a single digit
epsilon parameter (for differential privacy) has been ab-
sent so far even for the simplest of all tasks: generating
MNIST-like digits.
In this work, we propose a Differentially Private Condi-
tional GAN (DP-CGAN) training framework, which can
preserve the privacy of conditional GAN models using
DP [26, 27]. The main idea in DP-CGAN is that it clips
the gradients of discriminator loss on real and fake data
separately, which allows the designer to better control the
sensitivity of the model to real (sensitive) data. Moreover,
DP-CGAN can generate not only synthetic data but also
corresponding labels. Further, DP-CGAN employs the
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newly introduced Re´nyi Differential Privacy (RDP) Ac-
countant [34] to track the privacy budget. In comparison
to the classical MA technique, RDP accounting provides
a tighter bound on the privacy budget, allowing for the
addition of less noise without compromising the privacy
guarantees.
DP-CGAN framework has three main components:
conditional generator network, differentially private dis-
criminator network, and privacy accountant. At each
step of the training process, the discriminator network is
trained in a differentially private manner in which the gra-
dients of loss on real and fake data are clipped separately.
Afterwards, the sum of these two set of clipped gradi-
ents are computed and noised by adding Gaussian noise
to them. Then, the privacy accountant, which is based on
the RDP accountant [34], is updated by accumulating the
spent privacy budget at each step. Next, the generator net-
work is trained with a non-private optimizer. At any given
point in time, if the privacy budget exceeds the target one,
the training process is halted and the conditional genera-
tor network is ready for the creation of synthetic data and
labels.
We make the following contributions in this work:
• We propose DP-CGAN based on a new gradient clip-
ping and noising procedure, which improves the per-
formance compared to the standard procedure to pre-
serve privacy. To the best of our knowledge, DP-
CGAN is the first differentially private GAN frame-
work than can generate both the synthetic data and
corresponding labels with promising results. It lever-
ages the recently introduced RDP accountant and
TensorFlow Privacy1 package (by Google) to keep
track of the privacy budget.
• We provide preliminary experimental results show-
ing that DP-CGAN can generate good visual and
empirical results on MNIST dataset with single-digit
epsilon parameter. This suggests that our work can
be viewed as the first stepping stone towards training
high quality GANs with strong DP guarantees.
• We use the differnetially private conditional genera-
tive model to create synthetic data and labels which
are used (together) in the training of machine learn-
ing models. We test the accuracy of the learned mod-
els on real data and show that they perform well. We
get an area under the ROC (AUROC) of 87.57% us-
ing DP-CGANs compared to 92.17% if we were to
train the classifier directly on real data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides a background on GAN, CGAN, and
differential privacy. Section 3 overviews the previous re-
lated work in the area of preserving the privacy of deep
learning models. Section 4 describes the DP-CGAN
1https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy
framework in detail. Section 5 provides the experimen-
tal results and Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief
conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review Generative Adversarial Net-
works(GAN), Conditional Generative Adversarial Net-
works(CGAN) and differential privacy concepts used in
DP-CGAN.
2.1 GAN and CGAN
Nowadays, there is a great interest in using generative
models to create synthetic data that looks like the original
one. Generative Adversarial Network(GAN) proposed by
Goodfellow et. al [17] is one the primary methods to learn
generative models for images. GANs consist of two main
components: a generator and a discriminator. The gener-
ator takes noise as input and generates synthetic data by
capturing the original data distribution while the discrim-
inator takes the synthetic data (generator’s output) as well
as original data (training set) and learns to discriminate
between the real (training) and fake (synthetic) data dis-
tribution. The discriminator returns two possible values
as output which is the assigned score to a test sample rep-
resenting whether it is real or fake data. The generator and
discriminator always try hard to be as accurate as possi-
ble and the more the generator improves the quality of the
fake data, it gets harder for discriminator to distinguish
the difference between the original and fake data. These
two components always play a game and are trained si-
multaneously.
Suppose pz(z) is the probability distribution that ran-
dom noise z is taken from, G(z) is the generator net-
work that takes the random noise z as input and D(x) is
the discriminator network that takes the generator’s out-
put as well as the input data x taken form the distribution
pdata(x). The game that the generator and discriminator
play to achieve a trade-off, encapsulates in the following
objective function, V (D,G), of a minimax game:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) =
E
x∼pdata(x)
[log(D(x))]+
E
z∼pz(z)
[log(1−D(G(z)))]
(1)
Conditional GAN [35] is an extension of GAN in
which both generator and discriminator are conditioned
on some side information, y that can be any kind of
extra information like class labels or data from other
modalities. The objective function of a minimax game
for CGAN is as the following:
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) =
E
x∼pdata(x)
[log(D(x|y))]+
E
z∼pz(z)
[log(1−D(G(z|y))))]
(2)
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [26,27] is a mathematical framework
to express the level of privacy preservation of individuals
in a statistical databases. It provides strong privacy
guarantees for algorithms on aggregate databases. In-
tuitively, in differential privacy, the user should learn
about population as a whole but not about particular
individual. In other words, if we replace individual I
with another random member of the population, the
user should learn the same thing about the dataset in
presence or absence of individual I . Differential privacy
has become an actual standard in data protection in both
academia and industry [36] (Apple [37], Google [38] and
US Census [39]).
Definition 1. (differential privacy) A randomized
mechanism M over a set of databases D, satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy if for any two adjacent databases
d, d
′ ∈ D, with only one different sample, and for any
subset of output S ∈ R, the following inequality holds:
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ (3)
In pure differential privacy, δ = 0 and the additive
term δ does not exist while in approximate differential
privacy [26], δ is used for approximation in the cases that
pure differential privacy is broken. δ is the probability that
privacy loss is not bounded by  and its optimal value is
smaller than 1|d| (inverse of the database size).
Differential privacy is resistant to post-processing.
That is, any arbitrary randomized mapping of an (, δ)-
differentially private algorithm, is differentially private as
well.
Theorem 1. (post-processing) Given a randomized al-
gorithm M : D −→ R that is (, δ)-differentially pri-
vate and an arbitrary randomized mapping f : R −→ R′ ,
f ◦M : D −→ R′ is (, δ)-differentially private.
A routine approach to privatizing the output of a real-
valued function f : D −→ R is to add noise with variance
in the scale of f ’s sensitivity, Sf , to the output. The sensi-
tivity of a function f is defined as the maximum absolute
distance |f(d)− f(d′)| (d and d′ are adjacent databases).
In formal notion:
Sf ≡ max
d∼d′
|f(d)− f(d′)|, (4)
Gaussian noise is one of the popular kinds of noise em-
ployed in differential privacy, in which f(d) is perturbed
by Gaussian noise N(0, Sf 2.σ2). That is:
M(d) ≡ f(d) +N(0, Sf 2.σ2) (5)
Composability is one of the interesting properties of
differetnial privacy that makes it possible to combine mul-
tiple differentially private mechanisms into one. A stan-
dard analysis implies the composition of k mechanisms
that each of them are (, δ)-differentially private, is at
least (k, kδ)-differentially private [26, 27, 40]. One of
the possible ways of accounting differential privacy in
composition of additive-noise mechanisms is to use Mo-
ment Account technique introduced by Abadi et. al [33],
which provides strong estimates of privacy loss compared
to various versions of composition theorem [26, 40–43]
including strong composition theorem [43]. RDP accoun-
tant [34] is a new approach based on a new definition
of privacy, Re´nyi differential privacy, which provides a
tighter bound for privacy loss in comparison with Moment
Accountant.
3 Related Work
Some previous studies have proposed approaches to ad-
dressing the problem of preserving privacy in Deep Learn-
ing. Shokri et al. [22] developed a distributed approach in
which multiple parties train a model on their local train-
ing set independently. Then, each party selects a set of
key parameters, and shares them with the other parties.
Although this method has high training accuracy with-
out sharing the input parameters, Abadi et al. [33] showed
that the overall privacy loss for each party exceeds several
thousands on MNIST dataset using Moment Accountant
technique they introduced.
Moment accountant mechanism [33] can be used to
track the overall spent privacy budget, (, δ), for com-
posing Gaussian Mechanisms with random sampling (e.g.
training process in Stochastic Gradient Descent). This
method provides a much tighter estimation for privacy
loss compared to standard composition theorem [44]. It
computes the log moments of the random variable indicat-
ing privacy loss and then calculates the tail bound using
moments bound and standard Markov inequality. The re-
sult is privacy loss estimation in terms of differential pri-
vacy. In addition to Moment Accountant technique, Abadi
et al. [33] proposed a method to make the Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent(SGD) process differentially private.
Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE) [45]
is a framework that leverages the moment accountant
mechanism to trace the privacy leakage of knowledge
transfer task using differential privacy. It presents a differ-
entially private semi-supervised learning method in which
the training data is split into multiple disjoint sets and the
teacher models are trained independently. The teacher
ensemble predicts the labels after perturbing counts of
teachers’ votes by Laplace noise while the student model
is trained on public data as well as labeled data from the
teacher model and can be published publicly. Although
this method outperforms Shokri et al. [22] work in terms
of both accuracy and privacy, it assumes the model has
access to public data which may not be the case in prac-
tice. Moreover, the teacher ensemble just responds to the
queries for which the consensus among teachers is suffi-
ciently high.
Some other previous researches focused on preserving
privacy of GANs in particular. DPGAN method [28], en-
forces differential privacy during the training process of
the discriminator by adding Gaussian noise to the gradi-
ent of Wasserstein distance in WGAN algorithm and uses
post-processing theorem to guarantee differential privacy
for the generator. However, it is unclear how the over-
all privacy budget is accounted, the results do not look
promising even on MNIST dataset and there is no method-
ology for creating labels for synthetic images.
Similar to DPGAN method, PATE-GAN approach [30]
enforces privacy by making the discriminator differen-
tially private. In PATE-GAN, the discriminator is re-
placed with modified version of PATE [45] in which the
student model allows back-propagation to the generator
and there is no need to have access to public training data.
It employs the generated data to train different classifiers
and evaluate the quality of generated data by testing these
classifiers on real test data. The limitation of PATE-GAN
is that it assigns binary labels for synthetic data, and there-
fore, it is not applicable for multi-label datasets. More-
over, the datasets used to evaluate the model are small.
The other work is a DPGAN framework for time series,
continuous, and discrete data [29]. This framework is
alike the previous DPGAN work [28] except it employs
moments accountant approach to account the privacy bud-
get and clips the discriminator gradients while reducing
the clipping parameter over time (adaptive clipping).
Unlike DPGAN method [28], our proposed method
leverages RDP accountant technique to follow the con-
sumed privacy budget, (, δ) and generates not only syn-
thetic data but also the labels using a Conditional GAN
model. In contrast to PATE-GAN [30] which generates
only binary labels, our model generates multi-class labels.
Finally, in DPGAN frameworks [28,29] the discriminator
gradients are clipped and perturbed by adding Gaussian
noise to gradients of the discriminator loss, while in our
framework, Gaussian noise is added to the accumulation
of clipped gradients of discriminator loss on real data and
clipped gradients of discriminator loss on fake data.
4 Our Approach
As mentioned before, DP-CGAN can generate the syn-
thetic data as well as the corresponding labels while pre-
serve privacy of training samples. To this end, the DP-
CGAN makes the training process private by injecting
random Gaussian noise into the optimization process of
the discriminator network. Based on post-processing the-
orem [46] making the generative network differentially
private results in having a differentially private generator
too. DP-CGAN tracks the spent privacy loss using RDP
accounting technique [34], which provides tighter estima-
tion on privacy loss in comparison with moment accoun-
tant technique. The training procedure stops if the spent
privacy budget (, δ) goes beyond the target ones. DP-
CGAN makes the optimization process of discriminator
loss (discriminator training) differentially private by com-
puting the per-example gradients of the discriminator loss
on both real and fake data, clipping the per-example gra-
dients on real data and fake data separately, summing up
two sets of the clipped gradients, perturbing the clipped
gradients by adding Gaussian noise N(0, σ2C2), σ is
noise multiplier and C is clipping value, to them, and fi-
nally applying the perturbed gradients.
Algorithm 1 outlines the training process of DP-
CGAN. According to the algorithm, the model updates
the discriminator network and the generator network as
long as the number of iterations is less than maximum
iteration count and the spent privacy budget is less than
the target . At each step, it minimizes the discriminator
loss function by computing the discriminator gradients of
loss on real data and clipping them by L2-norm (lines 9-
12), computing the discriminator gradients of loss on fake
data(lines 13-15) and clipping them byL2-norm, compute
the overall clipped gradients of discriminator by adding
these two sets of clipped gradients, adding Gaussian noise
to them and taking average over all the perturbed clipped
per-example gradients in the batch(line 16-17), and finally
applying the gradients (line 18). The model tracks the
spent privacy budget by accumulating the spent privacy
budget and updating the RDP accountant every time that
noise is injected into the model(line 20). Then, the gen-
erator the gradients of generator loss are computed and
applied so that the generator network gets trained(line 21-
25). The last step is to check the overall spent privacy
budget so far. If the spent  or the spent δ has exceeded
the target values, training is stopped, otherwise it contin-
ues (line 26-27).
5 Experimental Results
We compare the performance of DP-CGAN to CGAN
with no privacy and CGAN trained with standard differ-
entially private approach.The CGAN architecture used in
all models is a vanilla CGAN in which both generator and
discriminator consist of two fully connected layers.The
generator takes random noise sample z and the corre-
sponding label y as inputs while the discriminator inputs
are real training sample x and its label y. Figure 1 depicts
Algorithm 1: DP-CGAN
1 Input: Examples {x1, x2, ..., xN}, labels
{y1, y2, ..., yN}, target epsilon , target delta δ,
noise scale σ, clip norm bound C, learning rate lr,
batch size bs
2 Output: Differentially private Generator that
generates synthetic data and labels
3 should terminate = False
4 while (step ≤ max step & ! should terminate)
do
5 - Sample random batch (Xt, Y t) of size bs with
probability bs/N from data distribution
pdata(X)
6 - Sample noise batch Zt of size bs from noise
prior pz(z)
/* Update the Discriminator Network */
7 d loss real←− log(D(Xt))
8 d loss fake←− log(1−D(G(Zt)))
9 Compute per-example gradients of
discriminator loss on real data Xt and clip
them
10 for i ∈ Xt do
11 Compute
gradd real
t ←− ∇θdd loss real(θdt, Xi)
12 gradd real
t = gradd real
t/max(1, ||gradd real||2C )
Compute per-example gradients of
discriminator loss on fake data Zt and clip
them
13 for i ∈ Zt do
14 Compute
gradd fake
t ←− ∇θdd loss fake(θdt, Zi)
15 gradd fake
t =
gradd fake
t/max(1,
||gradd fake||2
C )
16 Compute the overall gradients of
discriminator and add Gaussian Noise to
them
17 gradd
t ←−
1
bs
∑
gradd real
t + gradd fake
t +N(0, σ2C2I)
18 Take the gradient Descent step for
discriminator
19 θdt+1 ←− SGD(grads dt, θdt, lr))
/* Update RDP Accountant */
20 Accumulate the spent privacy budget using
RDP Accountant
/* Update the Generator Network */
21 g loss←− log(1−D(G(Zt)))
22 Compute gradients of generator loss
23 Compute grad gt ←− ∇θgg loss(θgt, Zi)
24 Take the gradient Descent step for generator
25 θg
t+1 ←− ADAM(grad gt, θgt)
26 if spent epsilon >  OR spent delta > δ then
/* Running out of privacy budget */
27 should terminate = True
the generator and discriminator architecture of the vanilla
CGAN. Differentially private CGAN models use the new
Figure 1: Vanilla CGAN Generator and Discriminator Ar-
chitecture
privacy package of TensorFlow Privacy (by Google), a
python library that includes the implementation of few
differentially private optimizers as well as the privacy ac-
countants to keep track of the privacy loss. They leverage
differentially private Gradient Descent as optimizer and
RDP accountant as privacy accountant from this package.
The dataset used used in the evaluation is MNIST hand-
written dataset containing 60k training samples and 10k
test samples. In the experiments, batch size is set to 600,
δ = 10−5 and learning rate is set by an adapative ap-
proach in which the initial learning rate is 0.15, it is de-
creased to 0.052 in iteration 10K and is fixed on 0.052 for
the rest iterations.
We trained Logistic Regression and Multi-Layer Per-
ceptron classifiers using the synthetic data and labels gen-
erated by the models and tested the classifier on real test
data. Closer performance of the classifier trained on syn-
thetic data generated by differntially private models and
on real data indicates that the model has captured the real
data distribution better. We measured the performance
of the classifier using the Area under ROC curve metric
(AuROC). In the evaluation process, the generative model
takes the 60k MNIST training data and the labels as input
and generates 60k synthetic labeled data.Then, the classi-
fier is trained on the generated data. Finally, performance
of the trained classifier is evaluated on the 10k test data
using AuROC metric.
Table 1. lists the results of AuROC for the three models
as well as the case in which classifiers are trained on real
data. According to the table, the AuROC of DP-CGAN
is higher than CGAN trained with basic differentially pri-
vate method, indicating that new clipping and perturbing
technique used in DP-CGAN improves the performance.
On the other hand, the AuROC of DP-CGAN is about 5%
lower than that for real data and this is the price we pay to
have privacy.
We also visualized the images generated by the models
(Figure 2) . In the figure, the most left column shows the
results for DP-CGAN, the left column represents the re-
sults for CGAN with no privacy, and the right column de-
picts the synthetic images generated by CGAN with basic
differentially private approach. According to the figure,
the quality of the images generated by DP-CGAN is bet-
Real CGAN DP-CGAN CGAN
with
basic DP
LR 92.17% 91.10% 87.57% 83.42%
MLP 97.60% 91.06% 88.16% 83.29%
Table 1: Comparing AuROC for Logistic Regression(LR)
and Multi-Layer Perceptron(MLP), which are trained on
real data, data generated by CGAN (non-private), DP-
CGAN and CGAN with basic differentially private ap-
proach using  = 9.6 , and δ = 10−5
ter than CGAN with basic differentially private approach
but worse than CGAN with no privacy.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: (a) DP-CGAN, (b) CGAN with no privacy, (c)
CGAN with basic differentially private approach
6 Conclusion
In this research, we proposed DP-CGAN framework that
is a differentially private GAN model capable of gener-
ating both synthetic data and corresponding labels. The
main idea behind DP-CGAN is that it clips the gradi-
ents of discriminator loss on real and fake data separately,
sums up two sets of gradients, and adds Gaussian noise to
the sum. DP-CGAN employs RDP account technique to
track the spent privacy budget. The experimental results
showed that DP-CGAN improves the performance com-
pared to basic DP-CGAN and generates promising results
on MNIST dataset.
The architectures we used for the generator and dis-
criminator are rather simple. We are going to consider
deep CGAN architectures with multiple convolutional
layers to improve the quality of the synthetic data while
spending the same privacy budget as we did for vanilla
CGAN. Moreover, our results are still preliminary and
we are going to show high quality differentially private
CGANs on more challenging datasets such as CIFAR100
and CelebA/B. Finally, our preliminary results are very
promising and we can extend our methodology to tackle
the mentioned challenges.
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